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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we investigate the tendencies of target candidate companies to manage earnings, which affects 
financial reporting quality, in order to increase transaction value, and the withdrawal of deals as a result of low 
financial reporting quality in M&A in a sample of 316 mergers and acquisitions in South Korea between 2002 and 
2011. Using the accruals quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality, we find the following. First, the financial reporting quality of target candidate firms is lower than 
that of non-target candidate firms because target candidate firms engage in earnings management prior to M&A. 
Second, low-quality financial reporting of target firms is positively related to the likelihood of deal withdrawal as a 
result of poor financial reporting quality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
e examine earnings management in target candidate firms before mergers and acquisitions 
(hereafter M&A) and the likelihood that the proposed M&A will be withdrawn as a result of poor 
financial reporting quality in South Korea.  
 
Whereas firms can make ongoing benefits (i.e., a lower financing cost) from submitting higher-quality accounting 
information, in the case of M&A, target firms get better when their financial reports are low. As described in 
McNichols and Stubben (2012), if accounting quality in target firms is poor, the value of their assets is uncertain and 
difficult to estimate. Therefore, there is greater variation in target firm value across potential bidders, and selling 
shareholders benefit to a greater extent because the expected winning bid will be higher. Thus, if target firms 
manage accounting information to influence over bidding price, they must have a potentially higher one-time profit 
from M&A with lower-quality accounting reporting. However, accounting quality plays an important role in the due 
diligence of an M&A. As such, excessively low-quality accounting causes deal withdrawal and failure to sell target 
firms.  
 
The results of this study are as follows. First, we find that the financial reporting quality of target candidate firms is 
lower than that of non-target candidate firms. Target firms have a tendency toward lower accounting quality in order 
to increase transaction value in M&A. This result is similar to those of other studies that discuss earnings 
management in firms with initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, which are also trying to increase 
transaction value (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998; Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). Second, we find that low financial 
reporting quality of target firms is positively related to the likelihood of deal withdrawn. Based on the first and 
second results, we argue that when target firms manage earnings excessively, which affects accounting quality 
negatively, in order to increase transaction value in M&A, deal withdrawal is more likely to occur. Deal completion 
is the minimum hurdle necessary to realize profit for target firms to sell in their own interest. As such, firms desiring 
to be targeted should maintain at least a market average level of accounting quality. 
 
Section 2 presents the hypotheses and the basis for our predictions, and Section 3 presents the details of the sample 
and research design. Section 4 describes the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
W 
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II. HYPOTHESES AND BASIS FOR PREDICTION 
 
2.1 Target Candidates and Financial Reporting Quality of Target Firms 
 
The use of aggressive accrual accounting policies to inflate current earnings prior to major corporate events has been 
of particular interest to both accounting and finance academics. Several studies to date have suggested that acquirers 
use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings prior to the merger announcement. Erickson and Wang (1999) suggest 
that managers engage in earnings management prior to stock-based acquisitions due to their incentives to increase 
their firm’s stock price prior to the acquisition for the US M&A market. In addition, Botsari and Meeks (2008) 
document that acquirers make income-increasing accrual manipulation in the period preceding the bid 
announcement to raise the market value of their stock for the UK takeover market. Louis (2004) also finds that 
stock-for-stock acquirers manage earnings in the quarter prior to the announcement, and that future stock price 
declines of acquiring firms are in part due to a reversal of the effects of pre-merge earnings management. Existing 
research has identified earnings management around stock-swap M&A from the point of view of the acquirer.  
 
Similar to acquiring firms, target firms may also have an incentive to increase per acquisition earnings. Erickson and 
Wang (1999) observe that "it seems reasonable to believe that both the acquirer and the target would anticipate that 
the other would manage pre-merger earnings, and that each would adjust the transaction price". However, in the case 
of earnings management by target firms, empirical evidence is limited. Erickson and Wang (1999) show that 
unexpected accruals for target firms were positive before M&A, but not statistically significant compared to 
acquirers from U.S. firm 1985–1990. North and O'Connel (2002) report that target firms managers reported 
increased earnings preceding and following M&A attempt. Target firms inflate current earnings prior to the 
transaction in the case of a hostile merger (Easterwood, 1998; Guan, Wright, Sun, 2004). They suggest that 
managers convince target shareholders to reject the offer in order to maintain their own positions within firms. 
Managers of target firms deflate current earnings prior to mergers in the case of a friendly merger in order to 
maintain their management positions and to report better results in the post-merger period (Ben-Amar & Misisoner-
Piera, 2008).   
 
We focus on target firms’ incentive to manage earnings to increase transaction value and the effect of this behavior 
on financial reporting quality. Whereas firms can achieve ongoing benefit from reporting higher-quality accounting 
information (i.e., a lower cost of capital), in the specific case of acquisitions, target firms fare worse when their 
financial reports are of higher quality. As described in McNichols and Stubben (2012), if accounting quality in target 
firms is poor, the value of the asset is uncertain and difficult to estimate. Therefore, there is greater variation in 
target firm values across potential bidders and the selling shareholders benefit to a greater extent from winning bids 
because the expected winning bid will be higher. Thus, target firms have incentives to manage earnings, which 
affects financial reporting quality negatively, in order to increase transaction value in M&A. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The financial reporting quality of target candidate firms is lower than that of non-target candidate firms. 
 
2.2 Financial Reporting Quality of Target Firms and Deal Withdrawal 
 
Acquirers gather and evaluate public information about the target firm to begin assessing whether to pursue a 
potential acquisition during preliminary due diligence. This includes reviewing the company's financial reports and 
other public information included in business report files. Public information can be gathered from analyst reports, 
articles in the business press, materials on corporate websites, and product brochures. The target firm first draws up 
a list of potential bidders. If prospective buyers sign a confidentiality agreement, they are then invited to participate 
in the next step of the process, the due diligence review, which involves more intensive dissemination of 
information, including presentations about internal financial statements, management reports and projections, copies 
of major contracts, discussions with senior management, plant and site visits, and review of financial, legal, and 
other documents that are assembled by the target firm and its advisors in the data room. It is important to note that 
although the information given to prospective bidders at this stage is extensive, it is chosen by the target firm and 
may therefore be incomplete. 
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After the winning bid is chosen, the winning bidder and target firm then execute and sign an acquisition agreement, 
after which the acquirer must conduct traditional due diligence. The acquisition agreement is a binding contractual 
obligation between the acquirer and target necessary to complete the transaction, but it does not guarantee 
completion. The acquisition agreement may include an investigation covenant, representations and warranties, and 
conditions to closing. The investigation covenant requires target firms to continue to provide acquirers with access 
to private information. Representations and warranties included in acquisition agreements are designed to certify the 
accuracy of the information which the target firm provides to the acquirer throughout the entire due diligence 
process. Representations also and ensure that there has been no material adverse change in the target's business as of 
the time of closing. Market-wide events (e.g., changes in industry conditions, new regulations) or target firm-
specific events (e.g., litigation, earnings restatements, loss of key customers, sharp declines in stock price) represent 
material adverse changes that can ultimately result in deal termination or renegotiation (Denis & Macias, 2011). 
 
Financial reporting quality plays a leading part in the due diligence of a deal because the review of financial 
statements is considered the most important section of due diligence. In this process, acquirers obtain more current 
and increasingly precise information, which is useful for valuing the assets acquired and liabilities assumed. 
Acquirers engage in activities such as reviewing the accounts receivable for collectability, counting inventories, 
intangible assets and searching for unreported liabilities and information. Relevant information is input into 
valuation models to value target firms. High-quality financial reporting reduces the costs of due diligence and 
renegotiation because it minimizes disagreement between bidders and target firms about target firm value before due 
diligence. Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Marquardt and Zur (2012) report that some of announced deals are 
withdrawn prior to completion. These results of prior studies support that part of acquisition agreement is cancelled 
during due diligence period. 
 
Low-quality financial reporting increases the cost of the due diligence process and renegotiation costs and increases 
the possibility of deal withdrawal because there is more disagreement between the acquirer and the target firm about 
the target’s value before the due diligence process begins. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The lower the financial reporting quality of the target firm, the higher the likelihood of deal withdrawal. 
 
III. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample Description 
 
The M&A sample is available from the S&P Capital IQ database. Annual financial statement of the acquirer 
company and target firm is extracted from the KIS-VALUE, or KISLINE databases. The acquiring firms are Korean 
firms publicly traded on the Korea Stock Exchange and target is also a Korean firm. The sample includes all the 
acquisitions in which more than 20% of the target company was acquired. In this study, M&A is defined as 
acquiring significant shares of target firms. In the process of sample selection, some data was lost due to incomplete 
financial information for target firms. In order to measure accounting quality in accordance with the hypotheses, 
financial data for at least four consecutive years is needed. Since many of the targets were young companies, data 
for four consecutive years was unavailable. In total, 258 completed acquisitions and 58 cancelled acquisitions are 
identifiable between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2011. 
 
3.2 Definition of Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Higher-quality earnings reports provide more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that 
are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker (Dechow & Schrand 2010). The Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No.1 (SFACNo.1) states that financial reporting should provide information that is 
useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit, and 
similar decisions. Information about earnings based on accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of 
an enterprise's present and continuing ability to generate favorable cash flows than information limited to the 
financial effects of cash receipts and payments. Therefore, we conceptually define higher-quality financial reporting 
as that which provides more information about a firm’s future cash flows that are relevant to M&A decision-making 
by the management of the acquiring firm and the target firm. 
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3.3 Measurement of Financial Reporting Quality 
 
We use a measure of accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting quality according to the method of Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) (hereafter DD) which are also used in Yoo, Lim & Chang (2013). According to DD, the 
measurement is founded on the concept that accruals are adjusted earnings that map into cash flows. Therefore, 
adjusted earnings supply a great measure of firm performance. In this model, accruals quality is measured by the 
extent to which working capital accruals map into operating cash flow realization as described in equation (1). I 
multiply absolute residuals from equation (1) by minus one so that this variable increases as accruals quality 
increases, as described in equation (2). All variables are scaled by total assets. 
 ∆𝑊𝐶$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐶𝐹-,./+ + 𝛽0𝐶𝐹-,. + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹-,./+ + 𝜀-,.   (1) 
 
where, 
 
ΔWC =(ΔCA–ΔCash)–(ΔCL–ΔSTD) 
ΔCA = change in current assets 
ΔCash = change in cash and cash equivalents 
ΔCL = change in current liabilities 
ΔSTD = change in short-term debt 
CF = cash from operations from the statement of cash flows 
 𝐴𝑄-,. = −1 ∗ ½𝜀-,.½ (2) 
 
Where, 
 
AQ = accruals quality 
ε = residual from Equation (1) 
 
3.4 Empirical Models 
 
We examine whether the financial reporting quality of the target candidate firms is lower than that of non-target 
candidate firms in testing of hypothesis 1 with the following model. 
 𝐴𝑄𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,. = 𝛽+ + 𝛽0𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒-,./+ + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ + 𝛽E𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ +𝛽H𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ + 𝛽M𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀-,. (3) 
 
The dependent variable, accruals quality of target (AQtarget), is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality as 
discussed in Section 3.2. The independent variable, target candidate, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm is a 
target candidate, and 0 otherwise. Target candidate firms include both firms that were actually sold and firms that 
planned to be sold, but for which the offer was withdrawn. We include four control variables for firm characteristics, 
industry, and year effect. For control firms(which are not target candidates), we use a propensity score matching 
model and select three times the number of firms. Control firms are matched for specific characteristics of the target 
candidate firms, such as size, leverage, and growth rate.  
 
We examine whether the financial reporting quality of target firms is negatively associated with deal withdrawal in 
testing of hypothesis 2 with the following model. 
 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛-,. = 𝛽+ + 𝛽0𝐴𝑄𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒-,./+ + 𝛽E𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒-,./+ + 𝛽H𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄-,./+ +𝛽M𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ-,. + 𝛽Y𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒-,. + 𝛽[𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ + 𝛽\𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡-,./+ +𝛽+)𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠-,. + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀-,. (4) 
 
The dependent variable, deal completion, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variable, accruals quality of target(AQtarget), is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality of 
target. Acquirer characteristics, including firm size, leverage, and Tobin's q are controlled. Deal characteristics, 
including method of payment (Cash) and relative deal value (Relativevalue), are controlled. To control target traits, 
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we include target firm size (Size_Target) and leverage (Leverage_target). Finally, we utilize control variables 
representing market conditions before and after the financial crisis (After_crisis) of 2008, industry effects, and the 
year effect. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics resulting from hypothesis testing 1 and 2 respectively. 
As we select three times of firms as a control group (non-target candidate firms), the mean of Targetcandidate in 
Panel A is 0.25. The mean of Dealcompletion in Panel B is 0.8165 and it means 81.65% of M&A deals are finally 
completed and 28.35% of deals are withdrawn.  
 
3.6 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 reveals the results of the logistic regression analysis based on the estimation in Equation (3) related to 
hypothesis 1, which compares the financial reporting quality of target candidate firms with that of non-target 
candidate firms. As predicted in H1, the coefficients of Targetcandidate are negative and significant at the 5% level. 
This result suggests that target firms have a tendency to manage earnings, which affects financial reporting quality, 
in order to increase transaction value. If target firms influence over accounting quality, target firms must have a 
potentially higher one-time profit related with having lower-quality accounting information. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Panel A. Target candidate and control firms 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
AQtarget 1264 −0.1047 −0.0700 0.1136 −0.7081 0.0000 
Targetcandidate 1264 0.2500 0.0000 0.4332 0.0000 1.0000 
Size_target 1264 24.5681 24.1801 1.5161 22.0023 29.2391 
Leverage_target 1264 0.5556 0.5636 0.2599 0.0461 0.9952 
Growth_target 1264 0.1330 0.0660 0.4396 −1.2158 2.2123 
 
Panel B. Completed deals and Cancelled deals 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
Dealcompletion 316 0.8165 1.0000 0.3877 0.0000 1.0000 
AQtarget 316 −0.1180 −0.0798 0.1262 −0.7081 0.0000 
Size 316 26.5655 26.1412 2.0565 22.9691 31.5062 
Leverage 316 0.4717 0.4917 0.1999 0.0692 0.9148 
TobinQ 316 1.2668 1.0749 0.7279 0.4031 4.7773 
Cash 316 0.7722 1.0000 0.4201 0.0000 1.0000 
Rv 316 0.1666 0.0680 0.2118 0.0001 0.9353 
For variable definitions, see appendix I. 
 
 
Table 2. Financial reporting quality of target firms and acquisition target candidates 
AQtargeti,t=β1+β2Targetcandidatei,t-1+β3Size_targeti,t-1+β4Leverage_targeti,t-1+β5Growth_targeti,t-1 
+β6CFO_targeti,t+IndustryDummy+Yeardummy+εi,t 
Variable Coeff. t Value 
Intercept −0.4042 −7.45*** 
Targetcandidate −0.0155 −2.18** 
Size_target 0.0125 6.25*** 
Leverage_target −0.0631 −6.67*** 
Growth_target 0.0202 3.43*** 
CFO_target 0.0295 1.26 
F-value 5.55*** 
N 1264 
Adj-R2(%) 8.60% 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. For variable definitions, see appendix I. 
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Table 3 reveals the results of the logistic regression analysis based on the estimation in Equation (4) related to 
hypothesis 2, which examines the relationship between financial reporting quality of the target firm and the 
likelihood of deal completion. As predicted in H2, the coefficients of AQtarget are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This result indicates that financial reporting quality plays an important role in deal completion. In other words, 
low financial reporting quality of target firms is positively related to the likelihood of deal withdrawn because the 
review of financial statements is considered the most important part of due diligence. Based on the first and second 
results, we argue that when target firms manage earnings excessively, which affects accounting quality negatively, 
in order to increase transaction value in M&A, deal withdrawal is more likely to occur.  
 
 
Table 3. Financial reporting quality of target firms and deal completion 
Dealcompletioni,t=β1+β2AQtargeti,t-1+β3Sizei,t-1+β4Leveragei,t-1+β5TobinQi,t-1+β6Cashi,t+β7Relativevaluei,t 
+β8Size_targeti,t-1+β9Leverage_targeti,t-1+β11After_crisisi,t+IndustryDummy+Yeardummy +εi,t 
Variable Coeff. Wald Chi-Square 
Intercept −4.6120 2.36 
AQtarget 3.3606 8.46*** 
Size 0.3218 6.18** 
Leverage −0.3645 14.84*** 
TobinQ 0.0460 0.04 
Cash −0.1081 0.07 
Rv 1.1063 1.28 
Size_target −0.0654 0.21 
Leverage_target 0.3236 0.25 
After_crisis −0.1156 0.12 
N 316 
Pseudo R2 (%) 10.78% 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. For variable definitions, see appendix I. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that management of financial reporting quality in target firms before M&A, 
which increases transaction value. In addition, when target firms have a tendency to manage earnings, financial 
reporting quality is affected negatively, which in turn is associated with deal withdrawal and failure of target firms 
to be acquired. As such, firms desiring to be targeted should maintain at least a market average level of accounting 
quality. 
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APPENDIX I. Variable definition 
 
Variable Definition 
AQtarget financial reporting quality of target firm as measured by Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
Size natural logarithm of total asset of acquirer  
Leverage the book value of debt scaled by the total book value of assets of acquirer 
TobinQ the ratio of an acquirer's market value of assets over its book value of assets 
Cash 1 if acquisitions are financed fully by cash, and 0 otherwise 
Relativevalue deal value divided by acquirer's market value  
After_crisis 1 if the acquisition occurred after the financial crisis of 2008. 
Targetcandidate 1 if a firm is target candidate, and 0 otherwise.  
Size_target target's size, the natural logarithm of total asset  
Leverage_target target's leverage, the book value of debt scaled by the total assets 
Growth_target target's growth rate, changes in sales divided by total asset.  
CFO_target target's operating cash flow divided by total asset. 
Dealcompletion 1 if the deal is completed, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
